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Abstract
Inflation targeting requires inflation forecasts, yet most models in the lit-
erature are either theoretical or calibrated. The motivation for this paper is
therefore threefold: We seek to test and implement an econometric model for
forecasting inflation in Norway–one economy recently opting for formal infla-
tion targeting rather than a managed nominal exchange rate. We also seek to
quantify the relative importance of the diﬀerent transmission mechanisms–
with basis in empirical estimates rather than calibrated values. Finally, we
want to focus on and exploit econometric issues required in the design and
estimation of econometric models used for inflation forecasting and policy
analysis.
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1 Introduction
Research on monetary policy has recently focussed on the conditional inflation fore-
cast as the operational target for monetary policy, yet the literature is dominated
by either theoretical or calibrated models–recent examples are Ball (1999), Batini
and Haldane (1999), Holden (1999), Røisland and Torvik (1999), Svensson (2000),
Walsh (1999), and Woodford (2000). We will argue that econometric evaluation of
models are necessary, not only as an aid in the preparation of inflation forecasts, but
also as a way of testing, quantifying, and elucidating the importance of transmis-
sion mechanisms in the inflationary process. In this way, inflation targeting moves
the quality of econometric methodology and practice into the limelight of economic
policy debate.
The motivation for this paper is therefore threefold: We seek to test and im-
plement an econometric model for forecasting inflation in Norway–one economy
recently opting for formal inflation targeting rather than a managed nominal ex-
change rate.1 We also seek to quantify the relative importance of the diﬀerent
transmission mechanisms–with basis in empirical estimates rather than calibrated
values. Finally, we want to focus on and exploit econometric issues required in the
design and estimation of econometric models used for inflation forecasting and policy
analysis.
Other comparable econometric studies addressing inflation targeting do exist.
Sgherri and Wallis (1999) estimate a small structural model for wages and prices
in the UK, which is related to our core model. Their main focus is on the role of
expectations and on evaluating monetary policy rules, including inflation forecast
targeting rules. Two other contributions comparable to our paper are the work
by Jacobson et al. (2001) and Haldane and Salmon (1995). Jacobson et al. (2001)
investigate the empirical basis for inflation targeting in Sweden within a vector au-
toregressive framework. Our paper departs from Jacobson et al. (2001) in three main
1Norway introduced a formal inflation target of 2.5% annual inflation on 29 March 2001.
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respects: we try to make judgements about the exogeneity status of the variables;
we test an explicit theoretical model of the inflation process; finally, we model the
transmission mechanisms of “shocks” as well as instruments. There is some com-
mon ground between our approach and the paper by Haldane and Salmon (1995), in
that both investigations start form a core model of the supply-side. Nevertheless, in
terms of methodology and the eventual model properties, the diﬀerences are easy to
see. First, we attempt to test theoretical predictions–like the existence or not of a
vertical long-run supply schedule–that Haldane and Salmon (1995) impose without
testing. Second, the estimated inflation uncertainty is much smaller in our dynamic
forecasts than in Haldane and Salmon’s study.
Expectations are important in modelling inflation. Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) argue in favour of backward-looking models, while Woodford (2000) has re-
cently argued that optimal monetary policy in general must be history dependent.
We model expectations as backward-looking, following Ball (1999) and Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999). If expectations are improperly modelled in the dynamic si-
multaneous equations model developed below, the model’s parameters might change
when policies change, generating misleading policy simulations, as emphasized by
Lucas (1976). However, empirical evidence for the Lucas critique is scarce, as doc-
umented by Ericsson and Irons (1995). We test for non-constancy with respect to
changes in exchange rate regimes that occurred within sample in Section 4.5, and
we test for constancy of model parameters over the sample. We cannot find any
evidence against backward-looking expectations.
In the rest of the paper logs of variables are denoted by lower-case symbols.
Section 2 sets out the core model of inflation as a wage-price system, conditional
on output, productivity, unemployment, and the exchange rate. The steady-state
properties of this model are evaluated in Section 3.1, while we derive a dynamic
model for wage and price growth in Section 3.2. We enlarge this core model to
a small simultaneous equations model with relationships for output, productivity,
unemployment, and exchange rates in Section 4, where the exogeneity assumptions
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underlying such a modelling strategy are examined in Section 4.5. We evaluate the
properties of the simultaneous equations model for inflation forecasting and policy
analysis in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The inflation process
The inflation process is modelled as emerging from the labour market. Firms set
their prices ppt to reflect a mark-up m2 over marginal costs. Assuming a constant
returns to scale production function, the target nominal price pp∗ is set as a constant
mark-up over normal (log) unit labour costs:
pp∗t = m2 + wt − prt + τ1t, (1)
where wt is the wage rate, prt is productivity, and τ1t is the payroll tax-rate. Derived
from first principles, equation (1) should be a discounted stream of expected future
marginal costs–see Gali and Gertler (1999)–so (1) can be interpreted as a steady-
state relationship. At first sight, (1) seems to exclude on important channel for
import prices on inflation. However, in the following we are focusing on nominal
wages and the consumer price index pt, defined as
pt ≡ (1− ζ) ppt + ζpit + ητ3t, 0 < ζ < 1, 0 < η ≤ 1, (2)
where the import price index pit naturally enters. The parameter ζ measures of
the openness of the economy. Also, the size of the parameter η will depend on how
much of the retail price basket is covered by the indirect tax-rate index τ3t.
Conflicting real wage claims are arguably the primary domestic source of in-
flation in economies where market forces are impeded by bargaining between orga-
nizations and intervention by the government, as in Norway as well as most other
European economies. A simple log-linear wage equation derived from the bargainers’
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respective utility functions and budget constraints can be written as:
w∗t = δ12ppt + δ13prt − δ15ut − δ16τ1t − δ17τ2t + (1− δ12) pt, (3)
where w∗t denotes the target nominal wage from the wage bargaining side of the
economy. The real wage faced by firms is aﬀected by producer prices ppt, productiv-
ity prt, and a payroll tax-rate τ1t. The real wage faced by employees is aﬀected by
consumer prices pt, and income tax-rate τ2t. The unemployment rate, ut, represents
the degree of tightness in the labour market which influences the outcome of the
wage bargain.
We assume that (2) also holds for planned variables. Hence, substituting out
pp∗t from
p∗t ≡ (1− ζ) pp∗t + ζpit + ητ3t,
we obtain the target equations
w∗t = (1 + ζd12) pt + δ13prt − ζd12pit − δ15ut − δ16τ1t − δ17τ2t − ηd12τ3t, (4)
p∗t = (1− ζ) (wt − prt + τ1t) + ζpit + ητ3t, (5)
or, in terms of real wages for workers and firms:
rw∗w = ζd12pt + δ13prt − ζd12pit − δ15ut − δ16τ1− δ17τ2t − ηd12τ3t, (6)
rw∗f = ζwt + (1− ζ) (prt − τ1t)− ζpit − ητ3t (7)
where rw∗w = w
∗
t − pt and rw∗f = wt − p∗t , and d12 = δ12/(1− ζ).
The static equilibrium considered in a number of earlier studies is defined by
rw∗w = rw
∗
f = rw
e, where rwe is the static equilibrium real wage. The two equation
are seen to imply a NAIRU, see e.g. Layard et al. (1994). The NAIRU is independent
of the price level, if (4) and (5) are both homogenous of degree one. However, and
rather obviously, the static model has no implications for the dynamics of prices and
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wages.2 Hence, to be able to derive formal implications for the changes in wt and pt
(i.e. for inflation) we must decide on a dynamic version of the model, as discussed
by Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998). For the dynamic model the relevant equilibrium
concept is the steady state of the system, which in general (in the case of a stable
dynamic system) is diﬀerent from the static equilibrium corresponding to (6) and
(7).
So far the model is made up of the competing claims equations for the real wage
and a definitional equation for the consumer price index. Formally, the model is not
determined since we have more unknowns than equations. In terms of economic
content the model is incomplete since nothing has been said about the development
of targeted and actual real wages. Although firms and unions have separate views
about what real wage level should be, they can only influence real wages through
nominal adjustment of wages and prices. In this way conflicting views about the
appropriate real wage level become an important source of inflation.
In the following, we embed the conflict view of inflation in a model that cap-
tures all the other relevant causes of inflation. In particular we allow wage growth
∆wt to interact with current and past price inflation, changes in unemployment,
changes in tax-rates, and previous deviations from the desired wage level
∆wt − α12,0∆ppt = c1 + α11 (L)∆wt + α12 (L)∆ppt + β12 (L)∆prt
−β14 (L)∆ut − β15 (L)∆τ1t − β16 (L)∆τ2t (8)
−γ11 (w − w∗)t−m + β18 (L)∆pt + ²1t,
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator, the αij (L) and βij (L) are polynomials in
the lag operator L:
α1j(L) = α1j,1L+ · · ·+ α1j,(m−1)Lm−1, j = 1, 2,
β1j (L) = β1j,0 + β1j,1L+ · · ·+ β1j,(m−1)Lm−1, j = 2, 4, 5, 6.
2Clearly, the common statement that inflation increases if rw∗w > rw
∗
f and falls if rw
∗
w < rw
∗
f
is ad hoc.
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The β−polynomials are defined so that they can contain contemporaneous
eﬀects. m denotes the lag order. This is a generalization of the typical European
wage curve, where the American version is derived by setting γ11 = 0–see Blanchard
and Katz (1999)
Any increase in output above the optimal trend exerts a (lagged) positive pres-
sure on prices, measured by the output gapt, as in Phillips-curve inflation models–
see Clarida et al. (1999). In addition, product price inflation interacts with wage
growth and productivity gains and with changes in the payroll tax-rate, as well as
with corrections from an earlier period’s deviation from the equilibrium price (as a
consequence of e.g. information lags, see Andersen (1994, Chapter 6.3)):
∆ppt − α21,0∆wt = c2 + α22 (L)∆ppt + α21 (L)∆wt + β21 (L) gapt
− β22 (L)∆prt + β25 (L)∆τ1t − γ22 (pp− pp∗)t−m + ²2t, (9)
where
α2j(L) = α2j,1L+ · · ·+ α2j,(m−1)Lm−1, j = 1, 2,
β2j (L) = β2j,0 + β2j,1L · · ·+ β2j,(m−1)Lm−1, j = 1, 2, 5.
Solving (2) for ppt and substituting out in equations (3), (8), (1), and (9), the
theoretical model condenses (3)—(9) to a wage-price model suitable for estimation:
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·
1 −a12,0
−a21,0 1
¸ ·
∆w
∆p
¸
t
=
·
α11(L) −a12(L)
−a21 (L) α22(L)
¸ ·
∆w
∆p
¸
t
+
·
0 β12 (L) −ζ
α12(L)
1−ζ −β14 (L) −β15 (L) β16 (L) −η
α12(L)
1−ζ
b21 (L) −b22 (L) ζα22(L) 0 b25 (L) 0 ηα22(L)
¸


gap
∆pr
∆pi
∆u
∆τ1
∆τ2
∆τ3


t
(10)
−
·
γ11 0
0 γ22
¸
×
·
1 − (1 + ζd12) −δ13 ζd12 δ15 δ16 δ17 ηd12
− (1− ζ) 1 (1− ζ) −ζ 0 − (1− ζ) 0 −η
¸


w
p
pr
pi
u
τ1
τ2
τ3


t−m
+
·
e1
e2
¸
t
,
where
a12,0 =
α12,0
1− ζ + β18,0,
a21,0 = (1− ζ)α21,0,
a12 (L) =
α12 (L)
1− ζ + β18(L),
a21 (L) = (1− ζ)α21 (L) , (11)
b2j (L) = (1− ζ)β2j (L) , j = 1, 2, 5,
d12 =
δ12
1− ζ ,
e1 = ²1,
e2 = (1− ζ) ²2.
map from the theoretical parameters in (8) and (9) to the coeﬃcients of the
model (10). This point is used to test parameter restrictions in Section 3.2.
The model (10) contains the diﬀerent channels and sources of inflation dis-
cussed so far: Imported inflation ∆pit, and a range of domestic channels: the out-
put gap, changes in the rate of unemployment, in productivity, and in tax rates.
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In particular, the role of conflicting wage claims is made explicit by expressing the
levels part of (10) as
−
·
γ11 0
0 γ22
¸
×
·
(w − p)t−m − (w∗ − p)t−m
−(w − p)t−m + (w − p∗)t−m
¸
.
Note that significance of the two EqCM terms implies refutation of the Phillips-
curve formulations that dominates much of the literature. Put diﬀerently, γ11 =
γ22 = 0 in (10) is seen to exclude conflicting real wage claims as a separate inflation
mechanism, which in the present setting amounts to no cointegration. Cointegration
is tested in Section 3.1.
The model in (10) can be re-written in terms of two real variables, (w − p)t
and (pi − p)t, real wages and the real exchange rate. Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998)
investigate the special case with first order dynamics, and show that the dynamic
system of (w − p)t and (pit − p)t is stable under quite general assumptions about
the parameters. For example, the model has a steady-state solution with ∆2pt = 0
even when one imposes dynamic homogeneity. The steady state is conditional on
any given rate of unemployment, which amounts to saying that the core model does
not tie down the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Instead, there is a stalemate
in the dynamic “tug-of-war” between workers and firms that occurs for a given rate
of unemployment. The analysis shows that the main insight of Haavelmo’s conflict
model of inflation, see e.g. Qvigstad (1975), namely that inflation is a generic
equilibrating mechanism of conflicting claims, generalizes to the open economy case.
We conjecture that a similar stability property for our version of the model,
although it has more general dynamics, a conjecture that is confirmed by properties
of the empirical model in Section 3.2. Given stability of the dynamic wage-price
model, the implied steady-state inflation rate follows immediately: Since ∆(pi −
p)t = 0 in steady state, domestic inflation is equal to imported inflation, which is
determined outside the core model. If there is a constant long-run imported inflation
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rate then
∆pt = ∆pit = constant. (12)
Since,
pit = vt + pft,
where vt is the nominal exchange rate, and the index of import prices in foreign
currency is denoted pft, the stability of imported inflation in (12) requires some
degree of stability in the nominal exchange rate, vt.3 To anticipate events slightly,
our empirical model meets the requirement in the sense that ∆2vt → 0 in the long-
run. But our results also indicate that “constant” in (12) is aﬀected by the nominal
exchange rate, and that the rate of inflation is therefore influenced by monetary
policy also in the long run.
3 Building the wage-price model
3.1 Modelling the steady state
From equation (10), the variables that contain the long-run real wage claims equa-
tions are collected in the vector
·
w p pr pi u τ1 τ3
¸T
. The wage variable
w, is average hourly wages in the mainland economy, excluding the North-Sea oil
producing sector and international shipping. The productivity variable pr is defined
accordingly. The price index p is measured by the oﬃcial consumer price index.
Import prices pi are measured by the oﬃcial index. The unemployment variable u is
defined as a “total” unemployment rate, including labour market programmes. The
tax-rates τ1 and τ3 are rates of payroll-tax and indirect-tax , respectively.4
3Assuming that ∆pft is exogenous.
4Compared to the theoretical model the income tax rate τ2 is omitted from the empirical model,
since it is insignificant in the model. This finding is in accordance with previous studies of aggregate
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In addition to the variables in the wage-claims part of the system, we include
gapt−1–the lagged output gap measured as deviations from the trend obtained by
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Institutional variables are also included. Wage com-
pensation for reductions in the length of the working day is captured by changes in
the length of the working day ∆ht–see Nymoen (1989). The intervention variables
Wdum and Pdum, and one impulse dummy i80q2, are used to capture the impact
of incomes policies and direct price controls.5 Finally, i70q1 is a VAT dummy. This
system, where all main variables enter with three lags, is estimated over 1966(4)—
1996(4).
All the empirical results are obtained wihPcFiml 9.2–see Doornik and Hendry
(1996). The steady-state properties are evaluated using the Johansen (1988) cointe-
gration procedure, after first establishing the presence of two cointegrating vectors.6
Diﬀerent forms of restricted claims equations suggested in the literature can be re-
trieved in (10) by suitable parameter restrictions on the equilibrium-correction part
of the model. We start from the two general claims equations
w∗ = p+ δ13pr − δ15u− δ16τ1− δ17τ2 + d12ζ
µ
p− pi− η
ζ
τ3
¶
(13)
p∗ = (1− ζ) (w − pr + τ1) + ζpi+ ητ3 (14)
where d12 = δ12/(1 − ζ). The omission of the income tax-rate τ2 from the
system implies that δ17 = 0.
Panel 2 in Table 1 reports the statistical long-run relationship in the form of
wage formation, see e.g. Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999), where
no convincing evidence of important eﬀects from the average income tax rate τ2 on wage growth
could be found.
5Wdum and Pdum are defined in the appendix.
6The test is based on a system that includes a restricted deterministic trend, following the
procedure suggested by Harbo et al. (1998). Using their Table 2 for the case with 5 exogenous
variables, the Trace-statistics of 82.73 and 30.20 (degrees of freedom corrected) gives formal support
to 2 cointegrating vectors: The 5% critical values are 49.3.(for the null of no cointegration) and
25.3 (for the null of r = 1 against the alternative of r = 2). The economic identification of the two
relationships can proceed without the deterministic trend, since a test of its significance (based on
r = 2) shows that it can be dropped from the system: χ2(2) = 2.0911[0.3515].
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the theoretical equations in Panel 1. The remaining panels report a sequence of
valid simplifications of Panel 2. Panel 3 shows a simplification where δ12 = 0 (and
hence d12 = 0), corresponding to full wage indexation to consumer prices.7 Panel 4
allows productivity to be fully reflected in wages (δ13 = 1). Finally, if there are no
eﬀects from producer prices, but the full payroll tax-incidence is borne by the firms,
so δ16 = 0, the two target equations can be formulated as:
w∗ = p+ pr − δ15u, (16)
p∗ = (1− ζ) (w − pr + τ1) + ζpi+ ητ3, (17)
with estimation results in Panel 4.
[Table 1 about here.]
The last results are very close to the results for Norway in Bårdsen et al. (1998)
for a sample ending in 1993(1), which is evidence of invariance to a sample extension
of 15 new observations. Figure 1 records the stability over the period 1978(3)-1996(4)
of the coeﬃcient estimates of Panel 4 in Table 1 (β in the graphs) with ± 2 standard
errors (±2se in the graphs), together with the tests of constant cointegrating vectors
over the sample. The estimated wage responsiveness to the rate of unemployment is
approximately 0.1, which is close to the finding of Johansen (1995) on manufacturing
wages. This estimated elasticity is numerically large enough to represent a channel
for economic policy on inflation.
[Figure 1 about here.]
On the basis of Table 1 we therefore conclude that the steady-state solution
of our system can be represented as
7Interestingly, an alternative that was rejected is defined by δ17 = 0 and δ16 = δ12 = 1, which
amounts to an equation where wage-costs depend on the real exchange rate (pt − pit)
w∗t + τ1t − pt = δ13prt − δ15ut +
ζ
1− ζ (pt − pit)−
η
1− ζ τ3t. (15)
11
w = p+ pr − 0.1u
p = 0.6 (w + τ1− pr) + 0.4pi+ τ3.
3.2 The dynamic wage-price model
We have established the steady-state properties of the wage-price model, as predicted
by (4) and (5). We now want to estimate (10) in order to test the predictions of
the model set out in Section 2. We impose the estimated steady state from Panel
4, Table 1, on a subsystem for {∆wt, ∆pt} conditional on {∆prt,∆yt,∆ut−1, ∆τ1t,
∆τ3t} with all variables entering with two additional lags. In addition to gapt−1,
we also augment the system with {∆ht, i80q2, i70q1,Wdum, Pdum} to capture
short-run eﬀects, as described above.
[Figure 2 about here.]
We start out by simplifying the system by deleting insignificant terms, estab-
lishing a parsimonious statistical representation of the data in I (0)-space, following
Hendry and Mizon (1993). The diagnostics of the system are reported in the upper
part of Table 2, while recursive tests of parameter constancy are reported in Figure
2. First, the two 1-step residuals with their ± 2 estimated residual standard er-
rors, ±2σ in the graphs. The third panel shows the a sequence of recursive forecast
Chow-tests together with their one-oﬀ 5 per cent critical level.
Next, we test whether the dynamic restrictions implied by (10) are data-
acceptable–see Appendix A–arriving at
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"
1 −1
−0.13
(0.05)
1
#" d∆wc∆p
#
t
=


0 0 −0.4× 0.36 0 −L2 −0.36
(0.08)
L2
0.06L
(0.02)
0 0.4× 0.07 0 0.13L2 0.07
(0.03)
L2




gap
∆pr
∆pi
∆u
∆τ1
∆τ3


t
(18)
−


0.08
(0.01)
0
0 0.08
(0.01)


·
L −L −1 0 0.1L 0 0
−0.6 L2 0.6 −0.4 0 −0.6 −L2
¸


w
p
pr
pi
u
τ1
τ3


t−1
[Table 2 about here.]
The lower part of Table 2 contains diagnostics for the model (18). We note
that the insignificance of Overidentification χ2(9) shows that the theory restrictions
in (10) are not refuted by the data.
The first equation in (18) shows that a one percent in the rate of inflation raises
wage growth by one percent. However, closer inspection of the equation shows that
this is not the case in general: The wage equation includes an indirect tax-rate,
lagged, with a negative coeﬃcient. The eﬀects of the discretionary policy variables
are not shown, but they include a negative coeﬃcient of the VAT dummy (i70q1 t)
and (ceteris paribus) positive eﬀects of price controls (Pdumt). Hence discretionary
policies have clearly succeeded in aﬀecting consumer real wage growth over the
sample period. However, in periods where such policies are oﬀ, aggregate wages
react quickly to “normal” or expected consumer price increases as captured by the
unit coeﬃcient of ∆pt. Import price growth is likely to be the most important
“unexpected” part of price inflation, so given the unit coeﬃcient on ∆pt, it is not
surprising that ∆pit is attributed a negative estimated coeﬃcient. The equilibrium-
correction term is highly significant, as expected. Finally, the change in normal
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working-time ∆ht enters the wage equation with a negative coeﬃcient, as expected.
In addition to equilibrium-correction and the dummies representing incomes policy,
price inflation is significantly influenced by wage growth and the output gap, together
with eﬀects from import prices and indirect taxes–as predicted by the theoretical
model.
As discussed by Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998), the question whether systems
like ours have a NAIRU property hinges on the detailed restrictions on the short run
dynamics. We note that the wage growth equation comes close to being homogenous
in consumer price and import price growth. Using, ∆pt ≡ (1−ζ)∆ppt+ζ∆pit this is
seen to imply that wage growth is almost homogenous in domestic producer prices
(∆ppt) and imported inflation. However, this does not imply that we are close
to having a NAIRU property: Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998) show that a necessary
condition for the NAIRU property is that wage growth is homogenous with respect
to ∆ppt alone. That homogeneity restriction does not hold in equation (18): Using
the estimated value of ζ = 0.38 from (1) the implied wage elasticities with respect
to ∆ppt and ∆pit are 0.62 and 0.24.8 The wage equation therefore implies that we
do not have a NAIRU model. Instead we expect that inflation stabilizes to the rate
of imported inflation for any given rate of unemployment, see Section 2 above.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The model has a very good fit, as Figure 3 documents, as well as having
constant parameters, as shown in Figure 4, which contains the one-step residuals
and recursive Chow-tests for the model. Finally, the lower left panel of Figure 4
shows that the model encompasses of the system at every sample size. There are no
evidence of any misspecified expectations mechanisms.
[Figure 4 about here.]
8If we introduce ∆ppt in the model we find a signicant eﬀect of the fourth lag, ∆ppt−4 with
coeﬃcient 0.14. The coeﬃcient of ∆pt falls to 0.71 but retain a t-value of 4.2. If we use ζ = 0.38
the implied elasticity with respect to producer price growth is 0.58, practically the same as implied
by the maintained model.
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4 The full model
The essential steps in constructing a full econometric model of inflation are illus-
trated in Figure 5. The core model of the inflation process corresponds to wage-
price model in the figure. There are three types of explanatory variables: feedback
variables , non-modelled variables (tax-rates, world-prices), and monetary policy in-
struments.
We initially treat feedback variables, e.g. unemployment, output gap, produc-
tivity, import prices, etc., as weakly exogenous variables in the wage-price model.
This is a testable property that we address after modelling the feedback relation-
ships in Section 4. The figure indicates that the feed-back variables are not only
functions of lagged wages and prices. Empirically they may depend on both the
non-modelled explanatory variables and on the policy variables.
Central banks do set interest rates, but (hopefully) diﬀerently under the dif-
ferent monetary policy regimes found in our sample. Thus finding an empirically
constant reaction function from inflation forecasts to interest rates is a non-starter.
We therefore treat the short-run interest rate as a policy variable. The exchange
rate, however, which depend both on inflation and foreign variables, is the important
monetary feedback variable.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Regime shifts may induce non-constancies in the parameters of the wage-price
model. If that is the case, the usefulness of the model for policy analysis is reduced,
as it then falls prey to the Lucas-critique. However, invariance can be tested within
the sample. We test if the parameters of the inflation model have remained constant
despite the parameter changes in the marginal models in Section 4. Invariance with
respect to structural changes outside the sample period cannot be tested directly.
However, it is possible to gain some insight through more indirect methods, since
there now exists a body of evidence from other countries. Sweden, who share many
of the wage setting institutions of Norway, changed her monetary regime in 1993:
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Rødseth and Nymoen (1999) do not find any impact on the parameters of their
estimated equation for Swedish manufacturing wages. Also, United Kingdom wage-
price formation has recently been investigated in Bårdsen and Fisher (1999) and
Bårdsen et al. (1998) with data spanning several changes in regime, including moving
from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting.9 The parameters of the model
remained constant across these changes in regime.
We also note that, unless inflation targeting is in every respect a truly new
regime, there may be periods in the sample where monetary instruments were used
in a way that resembles what one might expect if a formal inflation target regime was
in place. In particular, one can argue that this has been the case after December
1992, when the Norwegian Krone (NOK) went floating. Moreover, the exchange
rate that we use as a predictor of inflation, i.e. the trade-weighted exchange rate
variable, shows variation even in periods where the oﬃcial target exchange rate is
relatively constant. Thus, even a successful exchange rate targeting regime may
entail considerable variation in the trade-weighted exchange rate. Hence, while
not claiming to prove invariance of the Wage-price model with respect to a shift to
formal inflation targeting, we believe that invariance (or lack thereof) to changes
in the way the managed float regime have been implemented over the sample is a
relevant property of the model.
We have established a wage-price model conditional upon the rate of unem-
ployment ut, average labour productivity prt, import prices pit, and GDP mainland
output yt. In this section we enlarge the model to include relationships for these
four variables. This serves three purposes: First, all of these variables are poten-
tially aﬀected by interest rates and are therefore potential channels for monetary
instruments to influence inflation. Second, none of these variables are likely to be
strongly exogenous. For example, import prices depend by definition on the nom-
9The data covered the period 1976(2)—1993(1). The United Kingdom joined the ERM on
8 October 1990. Membership was suspended on 6 September 1992. The new framework was
announced in October first by a short letter from the Chancellor and then his ’Mansion House
speech’ later that month. The first Inflation Report was published in February 1993. Prior to 1990
sterling had been ’freely’ floating since the early seventies.
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inal exchange rate. Below we report a model that links the exchange rate to the
lagged real exchange rate, which in turn depend on the domestic price level. Third,
we make use of the marginal model to test the hypothesis of weak exogeneity that
underlies the wage-price model.
4.1 The nominal exchange rate vt
The nominal exchange rate aﬀects wages and prices via import prices pi. Hence, as
a first step in the completion of the model, we make use of the identity
pit = vt + pft,
and attempt to model the (log) of the trade weighted exchange rate index vt. How-
ever, Akram and Eitrheim (1999) model the exchange rate as equilibrium correcting
to the real exchange rate
vt − pt + pckt,
where pckt is log of a trade weighted index of foreign consumer prices. We build
upon their work, but also include an interest rate arbitrage eﬀect from
(RSt − 4∆pt−1)− (RSECUt − 4∆pckt) ,
giving the combined equilibrium-correction term
EqCMv (t) = (RSt − 4∆pt−1 −RSECUt + 4∆pckt) + (v − p+ pck)t−1
where RSECUt is the foreign interest rate, and pckt is the (logarithm of) the foreign
consumer price index (in foreign currency). Akram (1999) documents significant
non-linear eﬀects of the USD price of North-Sea oil. Our model is built along the
same lines and therefore features non-linear eﬀects from oil prices (OILt) in the
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form of two smooth transition functions, see Teräsvirta (1998),
OILSTt = 1/ {1 + exp [4 (OILt − 14.47)]}
and
DOILST = 1/ [1 + exp (OIL−OILt−1)] .
The implication of the first function is that an oil price below 14 USD triggers
depreciation of the krone, while the second captures depreciation caused by falling
oil prices. In addition, there is a negative (appreciation) eﬀect of the change in the
money market interest rate ∆RSt. Finally, there is a composite dummy
V dumt = i78q2 + 2× i82q3 + i86q4 + i87q4
to take account of devaluation events. Figure 6 shows the sequence of 1-step residuals
for the estimated ∆vt equation, together with similar graphs for the three other
marginal models reported below.
∆vt = 0.27
(0.07)
∆ (v − p+ pck)t−1 − 0.1
(0.04)
EqCMv (t)− 0.13
(0.02)
∆oilt ×OILSTt
− 0.03
(0.007)
∆oilt−2 ×OILSTt − 0.02
(0.007)
∆oilt−1 ×DOILSTt
−0.24
(0.08)
∆RSt + 0.02
(0.004)
V dumt
T = 1972 (1)− 1996 (4) = 100
σˆ = 0.96%
AR 1− 5 F (5, 88) = 1.24[0.30]
Normality χ2(2) = 1.35[0.50]
Heteroscedasticity F (31, 61) = 0.88 [0.64]
[Figure 6 about here.]
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4.2 GDP output yt
The model for ∆yt is adapted from the “AD” equation in Bårdsen and Klovland
(2000):
∆yt = −0.71
(0.08)
∆yt−1 − 0.51
(0.09)
∆yt−2 − 0.32
(0.05)
EqCMy (t) + 0.70
(0.12)
∆crt−1 + 0.06
(0.01)
[i85q1 + i86q2]t
T = 1972 (1)− 1996 (4) = 100
σˆ = 1.61%
AR 1− 5 F (5, 86) = 1.44[0.22]
Normality χ2(2) = 3.04[0.22]
Heteroscedasticity F (31, 59) = 1.09[0.38]
Apart from the autoregressive part, the model is mainly driven by the equilibrium-
correction mechanism for the product market, denoted EqCMy(t):
EqCMy (t) = yt−3 − 0.5cot−3 − 0.4yft−3 − 0.1(pi− p)t−2 + 0.9RRBt−1,
where co is real public consumption expenditure, yf is real foreign demand, (pi−p) is
accounting for the real exchange rate, and RRB denotes the real bond rate, defined
as
RRB = RBt − 4∆pt
where RB is the nominal bond rate (5 year maturity). The equilibrium-correction
term EqCMy(t), measuring the diﬀerence between (log) mainland GDP and aggre-
gate demand, has an estimated adjustment coeﬃcient of −0.32, suggesting a fairly
quick reaction to shocks to demand–the median lags to shocks in co and RRB are
5 and 3 quarters, respectively. The variable ∆crt−1 captures the impact of financial
deregulation (real credit expansion) on output. ∆crt−1 is important for explaining
output growth in the mid 80s, but in addition an impulse dummy for 1985p1 and
1986p2 are required to capture the two highest growth rates in this period. The
estimated equation also includes a constant and three seasonal dummies.
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4.3 Unemployment ut
The change in the rate of unemployment is explained by output growth. Another
important factor is labour market policy, represented by the variable amunt (log of
the ratio of labour market programmes to total unemployment) and of a variable
STUt−1 that captures non-linearities in labour demand (see Moene et al. (1997)).
STU acts as a shift in the intercept of the equation, the shift occurring at a 4%
rate of unemployment (our measurement of u). The interaction with ∆co and ∆yf
indicates that demand growth factors have relatively bigger eﬀects in periods of high
unemployment. There is are two sets of seasonals in this equation that are designed
to capture the gradual change in seasonal pattern over the period. The coeﬃcients
are omitted, together with the constant.
This equation has direct implications for the properties of the full model, see
Section 6 below. In particular, the level unemployment cannot be permanently
influenced by fiscal policy (a change in the level of co) or monetary policy (a change
in RRB). This follows since ut is a function of GDP growth, not the level of GDP.
Hence, although the wage-price part of the system does not imply a NAIRU, the
equilibrium rate of unemployment implied by the full model is independent of the
level of aggregate demand. Instead, it is determined by the growth rate of the
economy and of the governments willingness to accommodate open unemployment
by labour market programmes. There is one important caveat which stems from
the non-linear variable STU : If for example a cut in the interest rate causes the
rate of unemployment to fall below 4% (the threshold value of STU), equilibrium
unemployment reduces. The estimated coeﬃcients of ut−1 and STUt−1 indicate that
equilibrium unemployment is shifted down by 1.5 percentage points. More generally,
in a situation where the economy runs a rate of unemployment in the neighbourhood
of the threshold value, transitory shocks may be transformed into permanent eﬀects
on the rate of unemployment.
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∆ut = 0.30
(0.07)
∆ut−1 − 0.24
(0.04)
ut−1 − 1.79
(0.37)
∆yt − 1.13
(0.22)
∆yt−1 − 0.14
(0.04)
amunt + 0.46
(0.08)
STUt−1
−0.62
(0.32)
∆co× STUt−3 − 7.45
(3.08)
∆yf × STUt−3 − 0.76
(0.33)
∆ (pi− p)t−1
T = 1967 (1)− 1996 (4) = 120
σˆ = 0.081
AR 1− 5 F (5, 99) = 1.42[0.23]
Normality χ2(2) = 4.83[0.09]
Heteroscedasticity F (27, 76) = 1.61[0.06]
4.4 Productivity prt
The productivity equation is basically an autoregressive process augmented with
a negative eﬀect of ∆ut−1 and dummies that help whiten the residuals (again the
estimated constant and three centered seasonals are omitted).
∆prt = −0.37
(0.06)
∆3prt−1 − 0.03
(0.01)
∆ut−1 − 0.08
(0.01)
i86 (2)t + 0.04
(0.01)
[i79q2− i91q3]t
T = 1967 (1)− 1996 (4) = 120
σˆ = 1.35%
AR 1− 5 F (5, 107) = 3.14[0.01]
Normality χ2(2) = 5.42[0.07]
Heteroscedasticity F (17, 94) = 1.37[0.17]
4.5 Testing the exogeneity assumptions
Weak and super exogeneity refer to diﬀerent aspects of “exogeneity”, namely the
question of “valid conditioning” in the context of estimation and policy analysis
respectively–see Engle et al. (1983). In the light of the results reported above, it is
important to assess the possible exogeneity of output, productivity, unemployment,
and exchange rates. First, the cointegrating vectors have been estimated conditional
on output, productivity, unemployment, and exchange rates, and eﬃcient estimation
requires that these variables are weakly exogenous for the cointegration vectors (see
e.g. Johansen (1992)). Second, policy analysis involves as a necessary condition
that the wage and price equations are invariant to the interventions occurring in
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the marginal models of output, productivity, unemployment, and exchange rates;
together with weak exogeneity (if that holds) invariance implies super exogeneity.
As a means to perform tests of weak and super exogeneity, we supplement the
two equation models for wages and prices for Norway, with the marginal models for
output, productivity, unemployment, and exchange rates.
These marginal models (described in the previous section) can be written on
the form


∆y
∆pr
∆u
∆v


t
= A(L)


∆y
∆pr
∆u
∆v
∆w
∆p


t−1
+B ·Xt +C ·DUMt
+D
µ
EqCMw (t)
EqCMp (t)
¶
+


εy
εpr
εu
εv


t
. (19)
The autoregressive lag-polynomial matrix A(L) has all roots outside the unit
circle. The matrix B contains the coeﬃcients of the maintained exogenous vari-
ables Xt in the four marginal models described above. Auxiliary variables aﬀecting
the mean of the variables under investigation –significant dummies and non-linear
terms – are collected in the DUMt matrix, with coeﬃcients C. By definition, the
elements in DUMt are included because they pick up linear as well as non-linear
features of yt, prt, ut or vt that are left unexplained by the information set under-
lying the price wage systems above. In the following, we will refer to the auxiliary
variables as structural break dummies, notwithstanding the fact that they depend
fundamentally on the initial choice of information set used above to model wages
and prices.
While the first line of (19) can be seen as necessary step to ensure that the
usual assumptions about constant parameters and white-noise residuals are approx-
imately fulfilled for the marginal model, the second line of the equation enables us
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to test weak exogeneity. Following Johansen (1992) weak exogeneity of yt, prt, ut
and vt with respect to the cointegration parameters requires that the 4× 2 matrix
with equilibrium-correction coeﬃcients D = 0, i.e. EqCMw (t) and EqCMp (t) are
the equilibrium-correction terms for wages and prices. Note that, in testing weak
exogeneity, we are addressing the validity of an assumption underlying the analysis
contained in the sections above. Finally, to test super exogeneity we follow Engle
and Hendry (1993) and test the significance of the structural break dummiesDUMt.
Table 3 shows the results of testing weak exogeneity of output growth, pro-
ductivity, unemployment and exchange rate within the marginal system.
[Table 3 about here.]
First, the eight restriction implied by D = 0 in (19) are each acceptable,
hence the weak exogeneity assumptions of output, productivity, unemployment,and
exchange rates for the long-run parameters appear to be tenable. Looking at the
detailed results, only the error-correction coeﬃcient of the equilibrium-correction
coeﬃcient of EqCMw (t) in the productivity equation obtained a t-value of that
came even close to significance (−1.7), all the other error correction coeﬃcients had
t-values equal to one or smaller than one in absolute value.
Turning to the Lucas-critique, we note that the significance in the exchange rate
equation of the structural break dummies, i.e. V dumt and the three variables that
involve OILST variables, are overall quite high. Hence, the invariance test based on
these variables in the wage and price equations should be powerful for detecting the
empirical relevance of the Lucas-critique. We test the joint significance of these four
variables and the impulse dummies from the other three marginal models (i79q2,
i82q4, i85q1, i86q2, and i91q3) in each of the two equations of the wage-price model
and we find the following test statistics: χ2(9) = 6.6529[0.67] for wage equation and
χ2(9) = 13.331 [0.15] for the price equation. The insignificant test statistics do not
lend support to the Lucas-critique: If oil-prices and the regime-shift dummies induce
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shifts in expectations, and if forward-looking behaviour is an unaccounted feature
of wage-price formation, we would expect significant, not insignificant, chi-square
statistics.
5 Forecasting inflation
In the next two sections we use the model to forecast inflation and simulate eﬀects
of monetary policy. To close the model we include three “reaction functions”. The
first is a policy reaction function for labour market programmes (amun), the second
captures that the bond rate RB reacts to changes in the short interest rate RS,
with a lag and the third equation shows how real credit expansion (∆cr) depends
on output growth and the cost of interest bearing debt. Finally, in order to take
account of all implied feed-back links, the model is completed with the necessary
set of identities for the equilibrium-correction terms, real wages, the real exchange
rate, the real bond rate and so forth. With these new equations in place the system
is fundamentally driven by the following exogenous variables:
• real world trade (yft) and real public expenditure.
• Nominal trade prices in foreign currency (pft), and nominal consumer price
growth abroad (∆pckt).
• The USD oil-price (oilt).
• The monetary policy instrument, i.e. the short term interest rate (RSt).
Figure 7 illustrates how the model forecast some important variables over the
period from 1995(1) to 1996(4). The model parameters are estimated on a sample
that ends in 1994(4). These dynamic forecast are conditional on the actual values
of the non-modelled variables (ex post forecasts). The quarterly inflation rate ∆pt
only has one significant bias, in 1996(1). In that quarter there was a reduction in
the excises on cars that explains around 40 per cent of this particular overprediction.
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In the graphs of the annual rate of inflation ∆4pt this eﬀect is naturally somewhat
mitigated. The quarterly change in the wage rate ∆wt is very accurately forecasted,
so the only forecast error of any importance for real wages ∆ (w − p)t also occurs
in 1996(1). The forecasts for the rate of unemployment are very accurate for the
first 5 quarters, but the reduction in unemployment in the last 3 quarters does not
appear to be predictable with the aid of this model.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 7 also contains the 95% prediction intervals in the form of ±2 standard
errors, as a direct measure of the uncertainty of the forecasts. The prediction inter-
vals for the annual rate of inflation are far from negligible and are growing with the
length of the forecast horizon. However, forecast uncertainty appears to be much
smaller than similar results for the UK: Haldane and Salmon (1995) estimate one
standard error in the range of 3 to 41
2
percentage points, while Figure 7 implies a
standard error of 0.9 percentage points 4-periods ahead, and 1.2 percentage points
8-periods ahead. One possible explanation of this marked diﬀerences is that Figure
7 understates the uncertainty, since the forecast is based on the actual short-term
interest rate, while Haldane and Salmon (1995) include a policy rule for interest
rate.
To make our estimate of inflation uncertainty comparable to Haldane and
Salmon (1995), we calculated new forecasts for a model that includes an equation
for the short-term interest rate as a function the lagged rates of domestic and foreign
annual inflation, of nominal exchange rate depreciation, and of the lagged output
gap. The results showed a systematic bias in the inflation forecast, due to a marked
bias in the forecasted interest rate, but the eﬀect on forecast uncertainty was very
small. Hence it appears that the diﬀerence in forecast uncertainty stems from the
other equations in the models, not the interest rate policy rule. For example, Hal-
dane and Salmon (1995) use a Phillips-curve equation for wage-growth, and the
other equations in their model are also in diﬀerences, implying non-cointegration
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in both labour and product markets. In contrast, Bårdsen et al. (1998) find that
a core wage-price model with equilibrium-correction terms give very similar results
for Norway and the UK. Hence it is clearly possible that a large fraction of the
inflation forecast uncertainty in Haldane and Salmon’s study is a result of model
misspecification. However, future research should look more closely into the sources
of inflation forecast uncertainty.
6 Propagation mechanisms
In this section we discuss the dynamic properties of the model. In the simulations
below we have not incorporated the non-linear eﬀect in the unemployment equation.
Hence the results should be interpreted as showing the impact of monetary policy
when the initial level of unemployment is so far away from the threshold value that
the non-linear eﬀect will not be triggered by the change in policy.
6.1 Eﬀects of monetary policy
Figure 8 shows the simulated accumulated responses to a permanent rise in the
interest rate RSt by 1 point, i.e. by 0.01. This experiment is stylized in the sense
that it is illuminating the dynamic properties of the model rather than representing
a realistic monetary policy scenario. Notwithstanding this, we find that a permanent
change in the signal rate by 1 percentage point causes a final reduction in annual
inflation (D4p in the graph) by around 0.4 percentage point.
Next, recall that a main property of the competing claims model is that the
system determining (w−p)t and (pi−p)t is dynamically stable, see Section 2 above.
However, that prediction applied to the conditional sub-system, a priori we have
no way of telling whether the same property holds for the full model, were we have
taken take account of the endogeneity of unemployment, productivity, the nominal
exchange rate and the output gap (via the model of GDP output). However, the
upper middle and rightmost graphs show that the eﬀect of the shock on real wage
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growth, ∆(w − p)t, and change in the real exchange rate, ∆(pi − p)t, disappears
completely in the course of the 48 quarters covered by the graph, which constitute
direct evidence that stability holds also for the full system. Therefore, in direct
correspondence to the analysis of Section 2, the end of period eﬀect on the annual
rate of inflation ∆4pt the D4p graph) is essentially 4 times the rate of nominal
appreciation, ∆vt, shown in the lower leftmost graph in the figure.
The permanent rate of appreciation is closely linked to the development of the
real-exchange rate (v − p+ pck)t: The increase in RSt initially appreciate the krone,
both in nominal and real terms. After a couple of periods, however, the reduction
in ∆pt pushes the real exchange rate back up, and it settles above its initial level.
Because of the PPP mechanism in the nominal exchange rate equation, the new
equilibrium features nominal appreciation of the krone, as ∆vt equilibrium corrects.
This highlights the important role of nominal exchange rate determination–a dif-
ferent model, e.g. one where ∆vt is not reacting to deviations from interest rate
parity, would produce diﬀerent responses. Finally, the remaining panel depict the
response of the unemployment rate ut.
[Figure 8 about here.]
6.2 Inflation targeting: counteracting shocks
With inflation targeting in place an important policy decision is how much interest
rates need to be adjusted up or down in order to cancel the eﬀect of shocks on the
rate of inflation. Figure 9 illustrates the eﬀect on inflation and unemployment of a
one percent permanent increase to GDP–from a change in foreign demand, say–
without any monetary policy (the full lines) and when that shock is countered by a
rise in the interest rate (the dotted lines). Without any change in monetary policy,
annual inflation is raised one on one by one percentage point. Under a regime of
inflation targeting, the signal rate has to be raised by 1.7 points (i.e. RSt is increased
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by 0.017) to bring inflation back down. This policy response nearly kills the initial
inflationary eﬀect of the impulse to yt.
The exchange rate channel appears to be the important channel for monetary
policy during the first quarters after the shock. Within a 2-year horizon the eﬀect on
inflation is kept to a moderate 0.15 percent. Thereafter, the channels that go via the
real economy (unemployment in the graphs) take over, and the inflation response is
dying away quite rapidly.
[Figure 9 about here.]
7 Conclusions
We have argued that the success of inflation targeting on the basis of conditional
forecasts rests on the econometric properties of the model being used. We have also
argued that a model for wage and price interaction should be the core model of
inflation in discussing inflation targeting. Our sub-model for wage-price formation,
based on theories of conflicting claims, is accommodating all important types of
shocks to the inflation process (domestic demand and supply shocks, foreign infla-
tion impulses, exchange rate shocks and tax changes). We construct an empirical
model that is congruent with a priori theory, the measurement system and available
sample information in the sense of Hendry (1995), p. 365, see also Mizon (1995),
p. 115. Valid conditioning of the core model is established through the estimation
and testing of the marginal models for the feedback variables, and moreover, we find
support for super exogeneity of these variables with respect to the parameters in
the core model.
In the final exercise based on the full model, where we bring together the core
model with the marginal models, we show that the model can be used to forecast
inflation. As regards the eﬀects of monetary policy on inflation targeting, simulations
indicate that inflation can be aﬀected by changing the short-run interest rate. A
one percentage point permanent increase in the interest rate leads to 0.4 percentage
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point reduction in the annual rate of inflation. Bearing in mind that the main
channel is through output growth and the level of unemployment, interest rates can
be used to counteract shocks to GDP output. Inflation impulses elsewhere in the
system, for example in wage setting (e.g. permanently increased wage claims), can
prove to be diﬃcult to curb by tolerable increases in the interest rate.
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A Overidentifying restrictions
The model as set out in (10) provides us with several overidentifying restrictions
to test. First, in the wage equation the model predicts the following non-linear
dynamic restriction between import prices and indirect prices:
−ζ α12,0
1− ζ∆pit = −η
α12,0
1− ζ∆τ3t
while in the price equation the model predicts:
ζ∆pit = η∆τ3t.
Both hypotheses originate from the definition of the consumer price index in
(2). However, if we allow for a two period lag in the eﬀects of indirect taxes, the
substituted out dynamic eﬀects of producer prices on wages become:
−ζ α12,0
1− ζ∆pit = −η
α12,0
1− ζ∆τ3t−2
so
∆wt = −η
α12,0
1− ζ
µ
ζ
η
∆pit +∆τ3t−2
¶
+ · · ·
= −0.36 (0.4∆pit +∆τ3t−2) + · · ·
Here we impose the steady-state estimates ζ = 0.4 and η = 1 from Table 1;
we impose an immediate eﬀect of producer prices on wages; and we find dα12,0
1−ζ = 0.36
from 0.36L2∆τ3t. This hypothesis cannot be rejected with the available data.
Following the same kind of argument, the dynamic eﬀects of producer prices
on consumer prices are:
∆pt = η
µ
ζ
η
∆pit +∆τ3t−2
¶
+ · · ·
∆pt = 0.4∆pit +∆τ3t−2 + · · · ,
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This hypothesis, however, is rejected by the data. However, allowing for a
weighted down dynamic eﬀect, say by α22,0 < 1, of producer prices on consumer
prices suggests the following restriction in the inflation equation:
∆pt = α22,0ζ∆pit + α22,0η∆τ3t−2 + · · ·
∆pt = 0.07 (0.4∆pit +∆τ3t−2) + · · · ,
which is accepted by the data.
B Data definitions
B.1 Notes
1. Unless another source is given, all data are taken from RIMINI, the quarterly
macroeconometric model used in Norges Bank (The Central Bank of Norway).
2. For each RIMINI-variable, the corresponding name in the RIMINI-database
is given by an entry [RIMINI: variable name] at the end of the description.
(The RIMINI identifier is from Rikmodnotat 140, Norges Bank, Research de-
partment, 19th April 1999)
3. Several of the variables refer to the mainland economy, defined as total econ-
omy minus oil and gass production and international shipping.
4. In the main text, impulse dummies are denoted iyyqx, where yy gives the
year with two digits and x contains the quarter (1,2,3). Hence i80q2 is 1 in
the second quarter of 1980, and is 0 in all other quarters.
B.2 Definitions
AMUN Labour market programmes participation rate. Number of persons in ac-
tive labour market programmes relative to total unemployment (registered
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plus labour market programmes participation). [RIMINI: AMUN]
CO Public consumption expenditure, fixed 1991 prices. Mill. NOK. [RIMINI: CO].
CR Real credit volume fixed 1991 prices. Mill. NOK. Source: Bårdsen and Klov-
land (2000).
gap Output gap defined as log mainland GDP(log of the variable Y as defined
below) deviations from trend, where the trend is estimated by the HP-filter
using λ = 1600. Fixed baseyear (1991) prices. Mill. NOK.
H Normal working hours per week. [RIMINI: NH]
OIL Per barrel Brent-Blend oil-price. USD. Source: Norges Bank’s database of
economic time series.
OILST Smooth transition function of North-Sea oil price:
OILST = 1/(1 + exp(4 ∗ (OIL− 14.47)))
P Consumer price index. 1991=1. [RIMINI: CPI].
PCK Consumer prices abroad in foreign currency. 1991=1. [RIMINI: PCKONK].
PI Deflator of total imports. 1991=1. [RIMINI: PB].
Y Total value added at market prices in the mainland economy. Fixed baseyear
(1991) prices. Mill. NOK. [RIMINI: YF].
PR Mainland economy value added per man hour at factor costs, fixed baseyear
(1991) prices. Mill. NOK. [RIMINI: ZYF].
RS 3 month Euro-krone interest rate. [RIMINI: RS].
RSECU ECU interest rate.For the epriod 1967(1)-1986(3): Eﬀective interest rate
on foreign bonds, NOK-basket weighted. [RIMINI: R.BKUR] For the period
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1986(4)-1996(4): ECU weighted eﬀective rate on foreign bonds. [RIMINI:
R.BECU].
STU Smooth transition function of the rate of unemployment, U as defined below,
STU = 1/(1 + exp((−125) ∗ (U − 0.04)));
τ1 Employers tax rate. τ1 =WCF/WF − 1.
τ3 Indirect tax rate. [RIMINI: T3].
U Rate of unemployment. Registered unemployed plus persons on active labour
market programmes as a percentage of the labour force, calculated as employed
wage earners plus unemployment. [RIMINI: UTOT].
V Eﬀective import weighted value of the NOK. 1991=1. [RIMINI: PBVAL].
W Nominal mainland hourly wages. Constructed from Rimini-database series as:
W =WIBA ∗ TWIBA+WOTV J ∗ (TWTV + TWO + TWJ))/TWF
WC Nominal mainland hourly wage costs. [RIMINI: WCF].
Y F Weighted average of GDP of trading countries, using share of Norwegian exports
in 1985 as weights. 1991=1. [RIMINI: UEI].
Wdum Composite dummy for wage freeze: 1 in 1979.1, 1979.2,1988.2 and 1988.3.
Pdum Composite dummy for introduction and lift of direct price regulations. 1 in
1971.1, 1971.2,1976.4,1979.1. -1 in 1975.1,1980.1,1981.1,1982.1. Zero other-
wise.
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V dum Composite dummy for devaluation events. It is used in the marginal model
for the exchange rate and it is defined by:
V dumt = i78q2 + 2× i82q3 + i86q4 + i87q4
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Table 1: Testing claim hypotheses.
Panel 1: The theoretically identified claims equations
with nonlinear cross equation restrictions
w = p+ δ13pr − δ15u− δ16τ1 + d12ζ
³
p− pi− ηζ τ3
´
p = (1− ζ) (w + τ1− pr) + ζpi+ ητ3
Panel 2: Nonlinear cross equation restrictions
w = p+ 0.85
(0.16)
pr − 0.08
(0.04)
u+ 1.60
(0.83)
τ1− 0.03
(0.11)
(p− pi+ 2.66τ3)
p = 0.64 (w + τ1− pr) + 0.36
(0.06)
pi+ 0.95
(0.29)
τ3
χ2(4) = 7.49[0.11]
Panel 3: No eﬀect from producer prices and full eﬀect of indirect taxation
w = p+ 0.84
(0.16)
pr − 0.08
(0.04)
u+ 1.51
(0.85)
τ1
p = 0.63 (w + τ1− pr) + 0.37
(0.02)
pi+ τ3
χ2(6) = 7.59[0.27], χ2(2) = 0.1[0.95]
Panel 4: Full eﬀect of productivity and no eﬀect of payroll-tax
w = p+ pr − 0.09
(0.02)
u
p = 0.62 (w + τ1− pr) + 0.38
(0.02)
pi+ τ3
χ2(8) = 10.48[0.23], χ2(2) = 2.89[0.24]
Diagnostic tests for the unrestricted conditional subsystem
AR 1− 5 F (20, 150) = 1.25[0.22]
Normality χ2(4) = 1.05[0.90]
Heteroscedasticity F (66, 183) = 0.49[0.99]
The sample is 1966(4) to 1996(4), 121 observations.
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Table 2: Diagnostics for the system and the model.
Diagnostic tests for the conditional subsystem
σˆ∆w = 1.02%
σˆ∆p = 0.42%
AR 1− 5 F (20, 190) = 1.43[0.11]
Normality χ2(4) = 5.10[0.28]
Heteroscedasticity F (66, 242) = 0.76[0.90]
Diagnostic tests for the model in (18)
σˆ∆w = 1.01%
σˆ∆p = 0.41%
Correlation of residuals = −0.5
Overidentification χ2(9) = 9.92[0.60]
AR 1− 5 F (20, 200) = 1.20[0.26]
Normality χ2(4) = 4.14[0.39]
Heteroscedasticity F (66, 257) = 0.81[0.84]
40
Table 3: Testing weak exogeneity
EqCMw (t) EqCMp (t) EqCMw (t) & EqCMp (t)
∆yt F (1, 88) = 0.016 [0.90] F (1, 88) = 0.002 [0.96] F (2, 88) = 0.01 [0.99]
∆prt F (1, 108) = 2.88 [0.09] F (1, 108) = 0.07 [0.80] F (2, 108) = 1.59 [0.21]
∆ut F (1, 102) = 0.74 [0.39] F (1, 102) = 1.03 [0.31] F (2, 102) = 0.63 [0.53]
∆vt F (1, 91) = 0.05 [0.82] F (1, 91) = 0.08 [0.77] F (2, 91) = 0.16 [0.85]
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Figure 1: Identified cointegration vectors. Recursively estimated parameters and
the χ2(8) test of parameter constancy of Table 1, Panel 4.
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Figure 2: Recursive residuals for the conditional I(0) sub-system, together with
recursive Chow-tests.
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Figure 3: Actual and fitted values of quarterly wage and price inflation.
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Figure 4: Recursive stability tests for the model. The upper panels show recursive
residuals for the model.The lower panels show recursive encompassing tests (left)
and recursive Chow-tests (right).
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Figure 5: Model based inflation forecasts.
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Figure 6: Marginal equations: 1 step residuals and ±2 recursively estimated residual
standard errors (σ)
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Figure 7: 8-step dynamic forecasts for the period 1995(1)—1996(4), with 95% pre-
diction bands.
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Figure 8: Accumulated responses of some important variables to a 0.01 permanent
increase in the interest rate RS.
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Figure 9: The lines show the eﬀects of a 0.01 permanent autonomous shock to yt on
annual inflation and the log of unemployment. The dotted curves display the eﬀects
when the shock to yt is met by a 0.017 rise in the interest rate RSt.
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